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Abstract:  
Compensation schemes in which land owners receive payments for voluntarily managing their 
land in a biodiversity-enhancing manner have become one of the most important instruments 
for biodiversity conservation worldwide. One key challenge when designing such schemes is 
to account for the spatial arrangement of habitats bearing in mind that for given total habitat 
area connected habitats are ecologically more valuable than isolated habitats. To integrate the 
spatial dimension in compensation schemes and based on the idea of an agglomeration bonus 
we consider a scheme in which land-owners only receive payments if managed patches are 
arranged in a specific spatial configuration. We compare the cost-effectiveness of 
agglomeration payments with spatially homogeneous payments on a conceptual level and for 
a real world case and find that efficiency gains of agglomeration payments are positive or zero 
but never negative. In the real world case, agglomeration payments lead to cost-savings of up 
to 70% compared to spatially homogeneous payments.  
 
 
Key words: agglomeration bonus, biodiversity conservation, cost-effectiveness, ecological-
economic modelling, metapopulation, spatial heterogeneity,  
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1. Introduction 
Compensation schemes in which land owners receive payments for voluntarily managing their 
land in a biodiversity-enhancing manner have become one of the most important instruments 
for biodiversity conservation worldwide.  In the United States, the US Fisheries and Wildlife 
Service and over a thousand non-profit land trusts promote habitat conservation by using 
voluntary incentive mechanisms to elicit the cooperation of private landowners.  Based on a 
survey of state incentive programs, Defenders of Wildlife (2002) found about 400 incentive 
programs enrolling some 70 million private acres already exist in the 50 states—fifty percent 
of which were created within the last decade.  The typical state offers four to six conservation 
incentives, usually in some form of direct payment and easement with tax relief (also see the 
overview in Shogren, 2005).  In Europe, farmers receive several billion Euros annually in the 
context of agri-environmental schemes for applying biodiversity-enhancing farming measures 
(cf. European Commission 2005). Increasingly, payment schemes for conservation measures 
are also applied in developing countries (e.g. Landell-Mills and Porras 2002).  
These voluntary schemes are needed—they are necessary because property rights are 
frequently allocated so landowners have considerable latitude to manage their land in their 
own private interest.  Experience with the US Endangered Species Act also demonstrates that 
forcing owners of land with endangered species to carry out conservation measures might 
encourage them to eradicate these species to escape the burden of conservation costs (Brown 
and Shogren 1998).  
One key challenge when designing effective biodiversity conservation compensation 
schemes is to account for the spatial arrangement of habitats. The ecological literature 
addresses how specific habitats should be spatially allocated to maximise the targeted 
ecological benefit, such as population size, species viability, and so on (see, e.g, McDonnell et 
al., (2002), Frank and Wissel (2002), Drechsler et al. (2003)).  The design needs to consider   4
that the contribution of a habitat to an overall conservation objective depends on both its 
spatial extent and its location relative to other patches. In spatially structured landscapes, 
species populations exist as so-called metapopulations, which consist of subpopulations each 
of which inhabits a habitat patch. If individual members of the species can move between 
patches, the subpopulations interact.  In general, this exchange of individuals is beneficial for 
the survival of the metapopulation
1, resulting in the general rule for given total habitat area 
connected habitats are ecologically more valuable than isolated habitats (e.g., Simberloff 
1988; Hanski 1999). 
Given the voluntary nature of payment schemes, the question is how to induce land-
owners to select land for conservation so that habitats are connected?   Many payments are 
spatially homogeneous – every land-owner receives the same payment for a particular 
conservation measure. Such homogeneous payment schemes generate an ecologically 
valuable spatial configuration only if it contains the least costly patches. In contrast, Parkhurst 
et al. (2002) suggested an alternative scheme—the ‘agglomeration bonus.’  The 
agglomeration bonus provides an incentive to land-owners to generate a valuable 
configuration.  The idea of an agglomeration bonus is that a premium, a bonus, is paid on top 
of a standard payment for managing land in a biodiversity-enhancing manner if the managed 
patches are arranged in a specific spatial configuration.  
Such an incentive structure leads to higher ecological benefits but it can also lead to 
higher costs.  It may be necessary to include costly patches to achieve a desired spatial 
configuration. This suggests a trade-off exists between maximising total habitat size with 
inferior spatial configuration and optimising spatial configuration with less habitat size. This 
raises the open question of the overall cost-effectiveness of the agglomeration bonus idea—
does an agglomeration bonus lead to a higher ecological output for a given budget than 
homogeneous payments?  
                                                 
1 In some cases, the exchange of individuals among subpopulations may be adverse, e.g., spread of disease.   5
This paper addresses this question—we compare the cost-effectiveness of an 
agglomeration bonus against a spatially homogeneous payment. We compare two ‘pure’ 
payment schemes: (i) payments are only made when a certain spatial configuration is 
generated (agglomeration payment), and (ii) payments are made independent of habitat 
location (spatially homogeneous payment).
2  We first explore a conceptual analysis on a 
fictitious landscape to gain insight into how economic and ecological parameters affect the 
cost-effectiveness of an agglomeration payment.  We then compare the cost-effectiveness of 
homogeneous and agglomeration payments for a real conservation problem: the protection of 
an endangered butterfly species (Large Blue, Maculinea teleius) in a region around the city of 
Landau, Germany.  
 Our conceptual analysis shows that the cost-effectiveness of agglomeration payments 
compared to homogeneous payments is determined by the interaction of three effects: The 
connectivity effect captures the ecological benefits of agglomeration payments: spatially 
aggregated habitats are usually better for species survival than spatially dispersed habitats. In 
contrast, the patch selection effect makes homogeneous payments comparatively more cost-
effective. This effect arises because under homogeneous payments the most inexpensive 
patches in the landscape are selected; whereas with the agglomeration payment the selection 
is restricted which thereby induces the choice of more costly patches.  
Surprisingly, cost differences among patches are not necessarily an argument for 
homogeneous payments. The reason is that agglomeration payments reduce land-owners’ 
producer surpluses—which leads to the third effect, the surplus transfer effect.   To generate 
ecologically valuable spatial configurations, it may require the participation of land-owners 
who would lose money from participating. Their contribution can only be assured with side-
payments from other land-owners, which would reduce their producer surpluses.  
                                                 
2 For the sake of analytical clarity, we do not explore mixed schemes with a space-independent component and 
an agglomeration bonus.   6
In our model, the patch selection effect never dominates the other two effects, and 
agglomeration payments are always more cost-effective than homogeneous payments. In the 
butterfly case study, we find that cost savings of 30-70 percent can be achieved with 
agglomeration payments. 
 
2. Introduction of agglomeration payments 
Consider a landscape with N habitat patches. Let ri=(xi,yi) denote the spatial location and ai 
the size of patch i (i=1…N) and zi the land-owner’s decision to manage patch i in a species-
friendly “green” manner (zi=1) or conventional manner (zi=0). The vector z=(z1,…,zN) then 
characterises the spatial arrangement of green patches.  The opportunity cost (per habitat 
patch) to manage patch i in a green manner is denoted as ci.  For convenience, assume each 
land-owner possesses one patch so the words ‘patch’ and ‘land-owner’ can be used 
synonymously.  
Without a detailed specification, we assume an ecological benefit function Γ(ai,ri,zi; 
i=1…N) that increases if the distances between the patches, determined by their locations ri, 
decrease. A practical way to increase Γ is to increase the density of green patches, ρ, in some 
part of the landscape, denoted as R. The density of green patches in landscape part R is 










r ρ           ( 1 )  
The sum in Equation (1) runs over all patches contained in R.  If R, e.g., is a square of size 
|R|=100 ha and it contains 20 ha of green patches, then ρ=0.2. To achieve a desired green 
patch density, the conservation manager offers a payment p (money per patch area) to each 
land-owner who:    7
(1) manages the habitat patch in a green manner, and 
(2) in cooperation with other land-owners produces a density of green habitat patches ρ 
above a given threshold ρmin. The threshold has to be reached in a certain part of the 
landscape. For simplicity this landscape part, denoted as R, has a rectangular shape. To 
ensure that there is a single contiguous large area with the desired density only one 
single rectangle may be formed. The choice of size and location of that rectangle is for 
the land-owners to decide.  
In mathematical terms, a payment p is paid to land-owner i if and only if 
zi=1 and  R i ∈ r  and  
  ρ(R) > ρmin          ( 2 )    
A payment scheme is defined by the payment p and the threshold density ρmin.  Note for 
purpose of simplification we assume there is only a payment if the conditions of Equation (2) 
are met, i.e., no other, space-independent payment is considered.  
Land-owner i only participates in the scheme if the profit from participation is positive 
(0 > i π ) with  i π being determined by     
i i i c s p − + = π .           ( 3 )  
Side-payments si arise if the individual profit of land-owner i from scheme participation is 
negative but her contribution is required to generate a desired rectangle. In this case, si>0 
means land-owner i receives side payments and si<0 means she offers them. We assume land-
owners select a rectangle only if the aggregated  profit from all land-owners is positive 
( 0 > Π ).   
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is maximised
3. The side payments do not occur in Equation (4) as the sum over all side 
payments is zero. Having agreed upon a rectangle, the land-owners inform the agency about 
its location and size as well as the locations of the green patches. The resulting budget that has 






i i p a z B
1
.            ( 5 )  
The spatial configuration of green patches that maximises Π and thus represents the farmers’ 
choice is determined by forming all possible distinctive rectangles in the landscape (two 
rectangles are distinctive if they contain a different subset of patches). In each rectangle, 
profit is maximised under the constraint Equation (2).
4 If the threshold density is too high or p 
too small compared to ci, a positive profit may be unachievable. In this case, the maximum 







                                                 
3 We focus on the agglomeration incentive itself, and we do not address the transaction costs of the negotiation 
process. Sufficiently large transaction costs serve to reduce the efficiency of any incentive device, including the 
agglomeration bonus. 
4 Technically this works as follows: Start with all patches in the rectangle participating: zi=1. Then one by one 
remove all green patches (i.e. set zi=0) that have negative profits πi<0. Start with the patch that has the most 
negative profit, followed by the one with the second most negative profit and proceed until having either reached 
the marginal meadow (πi=-0) or the density threshold ρmin.   9
3. Functioning of the agglomeration payment 
3.1 Illustration of basic principle 
To demonstrate the idea behind the agglomeration payment, consider now the artificial 
landscape in Fig.1, in which all patches have equal size a and are arranged on a regular grid. 
The numbers in the circles represent the costs ci. With a payment of p=2.1 and a density 
threshold ρmin=0 (representing homogenous compensation payments) the three patches with 
c=2 are turned into green patches for a budget of 6.3. These three patches, however, are 
distant from each other and it would be desirable ecologically to have them closer together. 
This is achieved, e.g., by offering a payment of p=3.1 under the constraint that a green patch 
density of ρmin=0.5a/d
2 is exceeded, where d represents the distance between two adjacent 
grid points. 
  A number of possible rectangles R can be formed that fulfil Equation (4). The one that 
maximises the land-owners’ total profit is in the lower right corner with Π=3p-2-2-3=2.3 (eq. 
4). The required budget (eq. 5) for these three green patches is B=3p=9.3. It is higher than the 
budget required for p=2.1 without density threshold, because not the three least expensive 
patches are selected. We call this budget-increasing impact the patch selection effect.   In 
contrast, the connectivity between the patches, and thus the ecological effectiveness, has 
increased – an outcome we call the connectivity effect.  Since the two effects point into 
opposite directions, it is unclear a priori whether the agglomeration payment is more cost-
effective than homogenous payments. In the next section we investigate this question in a 
comprehensive manner on a general model. 
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3.2 Description of a conservation problem in a fictitious landscape 
We now consider the conservation problem in a fictitious landscape which we use to illustrate 
the cost-effectiveness of an agglomeration payment in a general manner. Defining an 
ecological benefit function without any loss of generality is impossible; so instead we use a 
general function to measure the connectivity of green habitat patches: 
∑∑
=+ =





j i j i ij ij j i y y x x d d z z
11
2 2 ) ( ) ( with ) exp( α     (6) 
where dij is the distance between two patches i and j. Equation (6) is based on a standard 
ecological model for the dispersal of individuals from one habitat patch to another: Usually, if 
an individual emigrates from a patch i its probability of reaching a patch j at a distance dij is 
assumed to be exp(-αdij), where α measures the dispersal ability of the species. Small α 
means individuals of the species are able to reach distant patches, while large α means they 
can only reach nearby patches.  From eq. (6) for given α, we see the connectivity Γ increases 
with increasing habitat area and with decreasing distances between habitat patches. Habitat 
patches close to a cluster of patches contribute more to connectivity than isolated ones. 
According to the theory of metapopulations (e.g., Hanski 1999), Γ is a good predictor for the 
survival probability of a metapopulation inhabiting the landscape.    
  With this measure of ecological benefit, an agglomeration payment scheme [defined as 
a combination of payment and density threshold (p,ρmin)] is more cost effective than another 
agglomeration payment scheme if and only if it leads to higher patch connectivity Γ for a 
given budget. For the general analysis we consider a landscape where the patches are arranged 
on a regular square grid with length and width given by dN
1/2 (cf. Fig. 1). Here N is the total 
number of patches and d is the distance between two adjacent grid points. The costs of 
patches ci are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution with mean mc and width 2σc.    11
  We consider a landscape of 100 patches, and we assume two levels of the dispersal 
parameter α: α1=1/d for a species with short-range dispersal that cannot travel on average 
much farther than from one patch to one of its next neighbours; and α2=1/(dN
1/2) for a species 
that can travel a mean distance of dN
1/2 and thus can reach any patch in the landscape with 
high and nearly equal probability.  
 
3.3 Analysis of the demonstrational conservation problem 
We now define a landscape by the number of patches (N), the distance between grid points 
(d), patch size (a), and mean and variation of costs (mc and σc). For several different 
landscapes (see below) we investigate 200 different payment schemes (p,ρmin).  For ρmin, we 
consider values k times a/d
2 with k∈{0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 1.0.}. At the 
lowest density level, ρmin=0, all patches that fulfil eq. (3) participate in the scheme. This 
represents the homogenous payment scheme that does not induce any explicit agglomeration. 
At the highest level of ρmin=a/d
2 each patch in the landscape must be a green patch. Values for 
the payment p are chosen so they encompass the entire range of costs, [mc(1-σc), mc(1+σc)]. 
We set these at p=mc(1+lσc) with l∈{-0.95, -0.9, -0.8, -0.7, -0.6, -0.5, -0.4, -0.3, -0.2, -0.1, 
0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. Systematic combination of the 10 levels for k 
and 20 levels for l leads to the 200 possible payment schemes. 
  Since the costs ci are uncertain, for a given payment scheme the size and location of 
the rectangle R and particularly the resulting connectivity Γ are also uncertain.  We account 
for this by randomly sampling the costs ci for all patches 100 times. Each of the 100 random 
sets of costs {ci}i=1...N may be denoted as a “cost landscape”. For each cost landscape {ci} we 
examine the 200 payment schemes. Means and standard deviations of the resulting   12
connectivity, the corresponding budget and the land-owners’ total profit are calculated for 
each payment scheme over the 100 random cost landscapes.   
  We restrict the dimensionality of the problem by rescaling some parameters: 
1.  We measure connectivity Γ (6) in units of a
2, which is achieved by formally setting 
a=1. 
2.  We measure density ρ (eq. 2) in units of a/d
2. Together with a=1 this is achieved by 
formally setting d=1. 
3.  We measure the budget B in units of the mean cost, mc, which is achieved by formally 
setting mc=1. 
These restrictions reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, as the only independent 
parameters to be varied are now σc and α.    Starting from a base scenario and varying each 
parameter independently, we consider the following three scenarios for N=100: 
a.  σc=0.1, α=1/d 
b.  σc=0.1, α=1/(dN
1/2) 
c.  σc=0.5, α=1/d 
 
3.4 Results  
Figures 2a-c show the results for the three scenarios. All figures show the connectivity Γ as a 
function of the budget for various density thresholds ρmin.  The density threshold ρmin=0 (solid 
line in Fig. 2) represents homogeneous payments; the expected cost-effectiveness 
improvements of the agglomeration payment are presented in Fig. 2 for various ρmin. 
  In all scenarios of Fig. 2 the cost-effectiveness of a payment scheme increases with 
ρmin, so all agglomeration payment schemes with ρmin>0 lead to efficiency gains compared to   13
homogenous payments. Why is this so, given the patch selection effect increases the cost of 
the spatially aggregated patch arrangements? The reason is the presence of a third effect that 
has not been considered yet: a surplus transfer effect. The agglomeration payment not only 
aggregates patches in space but also reduces the producer surplus of the land-owners. Without 
a density threshold (ρmin=0), only land-owners with positive individual profits, πi>0, 
participate. If a positive density threshold is set and only land-owners with positive individual 
profits participate, their number may be too small to reach the density threshold ρmin>0 and so 
they may not get any payments at all (eq. 2).  To get at least some profit individual land-
owners have to sacrifice some of their producer surplus and transfer it through side-payments 
(eq. 3) to the land-owners whose individual profits would otherwise be negative.   Now the 
density threshold is reached and a positive total profit obtained. To give a numerical example, 
set  p=2.6 instead of p=3.1 in Fig. 1. The profit maximising patch configuration can be 
achieved only if the owners of the two (c=2)-patches offer a side payment to the owner of the 
(c=3)-patch. Both the required budget (7.8) and the total profit (7.8-7=0.8) are reduced 
compared to the case of p=3.1.  
Two questions remain: (i) How does the magnitude of the efficiency gain depend on key 
model parameters: budget, dispersal range (1/α), and level of cost variation (σ)? (ii) Why 
does the patch selection effect never dominate surplus transfer effect plus connectivity effect? 
We now address each question in turn. 
 
The effect of the budget on the efficiency gain    
Figure 2 shows that high efficiency gains exist only if the budget is below a specific value 
(Fig. 2a).  For instance, in the case of ρmin=0.6 the connectivity (long-dashed line) exceeds the 
connectivity obtained from homogenous payments (solid line) only for budgets below 80mc, 
while for higher budgets both curves are identical, indicating zero efficiency gain. The reason   14
is that at high budgets there are already many green patches in the landscape and selecting one 
patch instead of another will not increase connectivity considerably (the connectivity effect is 
small). Furthermore, in such a situation the density threshold can be reached in the entire 
landscape already with those patches that have πi>0. In this case, there is no incentive for the 
owners of these patches to share their producer surplus (the surplus transfer effect is small). 
Each of them gains his full amount p-ci, which is just what one obtains under homogenous 
payments.  Overall, the highest efficiency gain in relative terms occurs with small budgets and 
decreases with increasing budget. 
 
The effect of the dispersal range   
Comparison of Figs. (2a) and (2b) reveals that for species with long-range dispersal efficiency 
gains are smaller than for species with short-range dispersal. This is plausible given that good 
dispersers are less dependent on the spatial configuration of habitat than poor dispersers (e.g., 
Drechsler et al. 2005), which means that for good dispersers the connectivity effect is smaller 
than for poor dispersers.  
 
The effect of the cost variation (σ)   
We find this effect to be ambiguous. For small budgets higher variation in the costs ci slightly 
reduces the cost-effectiveness of the agglomeration payment (compare the distances between 
the solid and dashed lines near the origins of Figs. 2a and 2c) while for high budgets it 
increases the cost-effectiveness of the agglomeration payment. The reason for the ambiguity 
is that for small budgets the patch selection effect is relatively strong, because a small budget 
means that patches that in the case of homogenous payments are dispersed over the entire 
landscape have to be in a very small rectangle, which leads to a high likelihood that costly   15
patches have to be selected. For increasing budgets the rectangle becomes larger and the patch 
selection effect decreases to zero (reached when the rectangle covers the entire landscape). 
The surplus transfer effect, in contrast, increases with the budget and therefore a point exists 
where both effects have the same magnitude, so that for relatively small (large) budgets the 
patch selection (surplus transfer) effect dominates and increases (decreases) the costs of the 
agglomeration payment compared to homogenous payments. 
The source of both effects is the variation among the costs (one can show that for 
uniformly distributed costs with range 2σ the magnitudes of both effects are proportional to 
σ). Together with the above considerations, this implies that increasing cost variation 
enhances the dominance of the patch selection (surplus transfer) effect at small (large) 
budgets and thus reduces (increases) the efficiency gain of the agglomeration payment. 
 
The dominance relations between the three effects 
We write the cost-difference between agglomeration payment and homogenous payment as a 
function ) ( ) ( 0 σ σ g f C C + + =  where C0
 represents the cost saving due to the connectivity 
effect and f(σ) and g(σ) describe the patch selection and surplus transfer effects. In the 
previous section we found that that the patch selection effect dominates the surplus transfer 
effect only at small budgets. However, this dominance cannot be strong, because Fig. 2c 
shows that in this budget range the impact of σ on the efficiency gain of the agglomeration 
payment is small. Since the connectivity effect does not depend on σ, this means that the cost 
difference C is basically unaffected by σ, i.e.,  . 0 / const C d dC ≈ ⇔ ≈ σ  Since this equation 
holds for all σ, including  0 = σ  where  0 = = g f , const must be equal to C0. Therefore 
0 C C ≈  for all σ , which implies  ) ( ) ( σ σ g f − ≈ . Altogether, the surplus transfer effect either 
dominates the patch selection effect or both effects largely cancel each other. Therefore   16
within the parameter ranges considered, the parch selection effect never dominates 
connectivity effect plus surplus transfer effect and the efficiency gain of the agglomeration 
payment is either zero or positive.
5 
 
4. Empirical study: Conserving endangered butterflies with an agglomeration payment 
4.1 The conservation problem 
We now apply the idea of an agglomeration payment to a case study, the conservation of an 
endangered butterfly species (Large Blue, Maculinea teleius) in an area near the town of 
Landau in Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany. The butterfly species is highly relevant for 
conservation as it is protected by the EU Habitats Directive.
6  M. teleius is a butterfly that 
requires the presence of meadows for its survival (see Thomas and Settele 2004 for details of 
the butterfly’s ecology). Each July, the adult butterflies deposit their eggs on the plant 
Sanguisorba officinalis. After a few weeks the larvae fall onto the ground where they are 
adopted by ants (Myrmica scabrinodis) which feed them in their nests over winter. For the 
survival of the butterfly, it is important when and how frequently meadows are mowed.   
Mowing may destroy the eggs and larvae on the Sanguisorba plant, and the abundance of the 
plant will be insufficient for egg deposition for the next couple of weeks. Too frequent 
mowing may also harm M. scrabinodis.  Mowing is necessary, however, because it avoids 
succession and preserves an open landscape.  Furthermore, rarely mowed meadows become 
overrun with thick vegetation which is unsuitable for the ants.  
                                                 
5 We have focused on mean values over 100 random landscapes. How does the variation among these landscapes 
affect these results? Our work shows that especially for small agglomeration payments the variation in the 
corresponding budgets and connectivities can be substantial; however, budget and connectivity are almost 
perfectly correlated. This means that in some landscapes a certain payment may deliver less connectivity than in 
another landscape, but at the same time the required budget will be smaller by the same factor. So the peculiarity 
of the landscape affects the effectiveness (connectivity) of the agglomeration payment scheme but not its cost-
effectiveness.  
6 We selected this case study given the intersection of data availability and high policy relevance.    17
  The butterfly’s dependence on a certain mowing regime explains why M. teleius was 
common in Central Europe until the 1950s, but since then has become endangered.  Prior to 
1950s, meadows of a region were not mowed all at once; rather mowing took place over the 
whole summer. Even if some meadows were unsuitable for M. teleius at a particular time, 
there were always other meadows to which butterflies could disperse and deposit their eggs.  
The development of machinery, however, made it possible to mow all meadows in a region 
simultaneously twice a year, first at the end of May and second six to eight weeks later. This 
mowing regime maximises the farmers’ profits but is unsuitable for the reproduction of the 
butterflies as the second mowing date falls into the weeks during which the butterflies deposit 
their eggs on the Sanguisorba plants.  
  Following the practise of German agricultural policy, we assume property rights are 
such that farmers cannot be forced to adopt conservation-enhancing mowing practises.   This 
implies a regulator will have to provide compensation to induce farmers to adopt a mowing 
regime beneficial to the butterflies.  The farmers’ opportunity costs of mowing at some other 
date differ depending on the mowing regime. As a general rule, opportunity costs rise with a 
later mowing-date because the energy content of swath and its quality as fodder decreases.   
 
4.2 Analysis 
We identify a cost-effective mowing regime for the region by relying on results from 
Drechsler et al. (2005).  The authors developed an approach to design a cost-effective 
payment scheme for the conservation of M. teleius in the case study region we now consider. 
The approach integrates an agro-economic cost assessment and an ecological model.
7 The 
agro-economic cost assessment determines the opportunity costs of the mowing regimes for 
each meadow in the case study region and the ecological model quantifies the effects of these 
                                                 
6 See Bergmann (2005) and Johst et al. (2006) for a detailed description of the agro-economic cost assessment 
and the ecological model.   18
mowing regimes on the butterfly population on a regional level. By comparing the ecological 
effects of different mowing regimes, the cost-effective mowing regime and the corresponding 
payments may be determined as a function of the conservation budget. In line with the current 
agricultural policy approach in Germany, Drechsler et al. assume for a particular mowing 
regime payments are not differentiated according to farmers’ opportunity costs but every 
farmer receives the same payment. In the current analysis we extend this work by determining 
the efficiency gains that can be achieved if the homogeneous payments analysed by Drechsler 
et al. are replaced by an agglomeration bonus. 
For this we consider the most-cost effective mowing regime analysed in Drechsler et 
al. that is not in conflict with other endangered species (mowing once every second year at the 
end of August) and compare its cost-effectiveness with a scheme based on an agglomeration 
payment.  The geographic data base for the analysis comes from a digitised satellite image of 
the case study area (10 by 6 km
2 with a resolution of 20 by 20 m
2). With the image one can 
distinguish between different landscape types in each pixel. We structure the landscape types 
into four types as experienced by the butterfly species: meadows, open land (e.g., traffic ways, 
lakes and rivers, arable land), forests (including shrubland), and settlements. Figure 3 shows 
the model landscape.  
We determine the areas of the individual meadows in the landscape by counting the 
pixels belonging to each meadow. The location of each meadow is defined by its midpoint 
such that the x (y) - co-ordinate of a meadow is the average of the x (y) - co-ordinates of all 




1/2 are calculated for all pairs (i,j) of meadows. The meadow sizes are required as 
an input for the ecological model and the cost assessment, and the pair-wise distances are 
needed for the ecological model.      19
The opportunity costs of implementing the above introduced mowing regime on the 
meadows come from Bergmann (2005). Following Drechsler et al (2005) we take into 
account both opportunity cost and the farmer’s administrative costs arising from scheme 
participation. In addition, farm specific characteristics may differ and different farmers may 
have different attitudes towards biodiversity conservation and may request slightly higher (if 
they are opposed) or slightly lower payments (if they are in favour). Assume farm 
characteristics and personal attitude are random among farmers and uniformly distributed 
between plus and minus 10% of the real (opportunity plus administrative) costs.
8  
We perform the analysis in the same manner as the general analysis in the previous 
Section. First we select a critical density ρmin(where  ρmin=0 represents the homogenous 
payment scheme) and determine the number and arrangement of butterfly-friendly mowed 
meadows that maximise the farmers’ profits.  Again assume farmers generate rectangles in the 
landscape and identify the one that maximises their profit. In a real landscape the number of 
rectangles to be considered would be too large to analyse. Therefore we consider a large 
subset of rectangles of different sizes, shapes and locations that systematically cover the entire 
landscape. For this we lay a regular grid with 50 by 50 cells on the entire landscape with the 
grid cells’ north-south and east-west dimension being 120m and 200m respectively. To find 
the outcome of the farmers’ negotiations we form all possible rectangles whose borders lie on 
the grid lines (which includes all 2500 rectangles made of one grid cell, all 4900 rectangles 
made of two adjacent grid cells, etc., … up to the largest possible rectangle that includes all 
2500 cells). For each agglomeration payment, from these rectangles we determine the one that 
maximises the farmers’ total profit and the corresponding budget and area of meadows 
occupied by butterflies. The area occupied by butterflies is calculated using a spatially explicit 
                                                 
8 We only consider medium sized meadows between 0.75ha and 1.5ha. European legislation allows 
compensation for farmers’ administrative costs only as a percentage of opportunity costs and, therefore, the 
administrative effort to participate in conservation schemes with small meadows may be too high. Large 
meadows are excluded, because their areas are likely to be overestimated. We do not have data about ownership 
of meadows and the satellite image which forms the data base of the analysis can depict roads that separate 
meadows but not fences.   20
stochastic simulation model (Johst at al. 2006) which considers the life cycle of the species, 
the dispersal between the meadows, weather fluctuations and the landscape dynamics caused 
by the mowing events.  
As the costs of implementing the mowing regime contain a random element, we 
consider four different random cost landscapes and determine mean area of occupied 
meadows and the mean budget.  
 
4.3 Results 
Figure 4 shows the efficiency gains achieved by the agglomeration payment compared to a 
homogeneous payment scheme. The efficiency gain increases with the density threshold ρmin. 
A maximum of ρmin=0.02 (equivalent to 2 ha of green meadow per km
2) is considered in the 
figure, as higher thresholds do not lead to further efficiency gains. Efficiency gains of 
agglomeration payments are substantial for low and medium sized budgets. They range from 
about 70% for a budget of 3,000€ to about 30% for a budget of 10,000€.  Wätzold et al. 
(2006) found that with 10,000€ the extinction risk of Maculinea could be strongly reduced in 
the case study region.  
The observation that efficiency gains are largest for low budgets is in line with results 
from the conceptual model (cf. section 3.4; Fig.2). The reason is that with low budgets only 
few meadows are managed in a green manner. Under homogeneous payments these would be 
dispersed over the entire landscape and agglomerating them strongly increases their 
connectivity. In contrast, for high budgets there are many green meadows in the landscape 
whose connectivity would be sufficient even under homogeneous payments.  
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5. Summary and Discussion 
Designing effective compensation payment schemes for biodiversity conservation requires 
accounting for the spatial configuration of habitat patches.  One scheme that has been 
proposed to generate an ecologically valuable configuration is the agglomeration bonus (see 
Parkhurst et al., 2002).   Land-owners receive an agglomeration payment if habitat patches are 
arranged in an ecologically beneficial configuration. While ecological benefits increase with 
the bonus scheme, the costs of implementation are expected to increase as more costly patches 
tend to be selected.  This raises the open question of how cost-effective an agglomeration 
payment is relative to spatially homogeneous payments. Herein we address this question at 
both a conceptual level and for a specific conservation study – the design of payments for 
butterfly-friendly grassland management in the region of Landau, Germany. We find the cost-
effectiveness of an agglomeration payment is determined by the interaction of three 
mechanisms: (i) the connectivity effect, (ii) the patch selection effect, and (iii) the surplus 
transfer effect. 
The connectivity effect (i) represents the point that ceteris paribus a spatially 
aggregated arrangement of habitats usually leads to higher survival rates of endangered 
species than spatially dispersed habitats und thus the agglomeration bonus increases the 
ecological effectiveness of the habitat network for a given budget. The ecological reason for 
this is that the viability of most endangered species inhabiting fragmented landscapes 
increases when the dispersal of individuals among the habitat patches is increased. The 
connectivity effect is strongest when the conservation budget or the dispersal range of the 
species is small, or both. The reason is that in the case of a small budget, only few habitats are 
created which under homogenous payments are dispersed all over the landscape. The 
distances between these patches are too large for the species to cross, especially if the species 
has a small dispersal range. Spatial aggregation of these few patches strongly improves the   22
dispersal among them. The dispersal range of the Large Blue butterfly analysed in the case 
study is so small (on average ca. 1 km) that for homogeneous payments and small budgets the 
distances between habitat patches are larger than the species’ dispersal distances, and so the 
connectivity effect is relevant. 
The patch selection effect (ii) arises, because different patches are selected under 
homogeneous payments and under the agglomeration payment. Under homogeneous 
payments the most inexpensive patches out of all patches in the landscape are chosen while 
under the agglomeration payment the selection can be made only from the patches contained 
in a smaller compartment (rectangle R) of the landscape. As a consequence, selecting N 
patches from the compartment is more expensive than selecting the same number of patches 
out of the entire landscape. This cost increase, or the patch selection effect, is largest when the 
cost heterogeneity (σ) among the patches in the landscape is high. 
The surplus transfer effect (iii) is a consequence of the density threshold ρmin that has 
to be exceeded by the land-owners to receive a payment. Depending on the specific situation, 
some of the land-owners will be confronted with the choice between not receiving any 
payment and offering side-payments to farmers whose participation in the programme is 
necessary to reach the density threshold but whose individual profits would be negative 
without the side payments. The side-payments reduce the overall producer surplus –an effect 
that is largest when the cost heterogeneity (σ) among the patches in the landscape is high. 
The surplus transfer effect is responsible for the unexpected result that within the 
scope of our analysis the efficiency gain of the agglomeration payment is always positive 
(Fig. 2). Without the surplus transfer effect there would be the expected trade-off between 
connectivity and patch selection effect, and too high cost variation would cause the patch 
selection effect to dominate the connectivity effect, leading to negative efficiency gains.  But 
since the surplus transfer effect also increases with increasing cost variation but points into   23
the opposite direction, it effectively neutralises the patch selection effect. The connectivity 
effect prevails and unambiguously increases the cost-effectiveness of the agglomeration 
payment, especially if the dispersal range of the species is small.  
Whether the patch selection effect or the surplus transfer effect dominates depends on 
various factors, such as the spatial distribution of the costs and the number of habitat patches 
participating in the scheme. Within our model analysis we found that for small (large) budgets 
the patch selection effect dominates the surplus transfer effect. As the magnitude of both 
effects increases with increasing cost variation, increasing cost variation decreases (increases) 
the cost-effectiveness of the agglomeration payment at small (large) budgets. This may, 
however, be a consequence of the assumption of the costs being spatially uncorrelated. If 
there are strong cost gradients in the landscape, the outcome may be different. 
The real world case study on the conservation of the Large Blue butterfly confirms the 
general results. We find efficiency gains of up to 70% may be achieved with agglomeration 
payments. For the conservation of species with smaller dispersal ranges than the Large Blue 
efficiency gains may be even larger. Bearing in mind that in Europe and the US several billion 
Euro and dollars are spent each year on conservation this suggests that significant 
improvements in conservation management could be made if agglomeration payments are 
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Figure 2: Mean connectivity versus mean budget (measured in units of mean patch cost mc) 
for the different levels of ρmin. Solid line: ρmin=0 (homogeneous payments). Dashed lines: ρmin 
increasing from bottom to top with levels 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8. Panels (a)-(c) represent 
scenarios (a)-(c). Budget and connectivity are averages over the 100 random cost landscapes 
{ci}. 
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Figure 3: The model landscape (black: settlement/roads; dark grey: forest; light grey: open 
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Figure 4: Area of occupied meadows versus budget (means over four random landscapes) for 
four different density thresholds ρmin (ρmin=0 representing the homogenous payment scheme). 
The density threshold increases from bottom to top. 
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